Cournot Competition Yields Spatial Avoiding Competition in Groups by Chia-Ming Yu & Fu-Chuan Lai
Cournot Competition Yields Spatial Avoiding Competition in Groups∗
by
Chia-Ming Yu† and Fu-Chuan Lai‡
National Taipei University
January 22, 2003
Abstract. This paper characterizes the properties of equilibrium location patterns in an
Anderson-Neven-Pal model and uses these characteristics to comprehensively ﬁnd the subgame
perfect Nash equilibria, most of which are not yet found in the literature. Since the exter-
nal competition eﬀect may be exactly canceled out, or internal competition strictly dominates
external competition, or the internal competition eﬀect is consistent with the external competi-
tion eﬀect, therefore without any externality and prior collusion, a competitive group structure
may form endogenously in equilibrium and ﬁrms tend to avoid competition inside each group.
The analyses of an Anderson-Neven-Pal model are instructive in studying the conditions for a
capacity to implement a “Nash combination.”
Keywords: Cournot; Spatial Competition; Agglomeration
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D43; L13
∗We would like to thank Chien-Fu Chou, De-Xing Guan, Shin-Kun Peng, Hsiao-Chi Chen, and Mei Hsu for
their valuable comments. Responsibility for any remaining errors rests with the authors.
†Department of Economics, National Taipei University, No. 67, Sec. 3, Ming-Sheng E. Rd, Taipei, Taiwan.
Tel: +886-2-2505-6315. Fax: +886-2-2501-7241. Email: cm.yu@msa.hinet.net, cmyu@mail.ntpu.edu.tw
‡Department of Economics, National Taipei University, No. 67, Sec. 3, Ming-Sheng E. Rd, Taipei, Taiwan.
Tel: +886-2-2517-8164. Fax: +886-2-2501-7241. Email: uiuclai@mail.ntpu.edu.twCournot Competition Yields Spatial Avoiding Competition in Groups
Abstract
This paper characterizes the properties of equilibrium location patterns in an Anderson-
Neven-Pal model and uses these characteristics to comprehensively ﬁnd the subgame perfect
Nash equilibria, most of which are not yet found in the literature. Since the external compe-
tition eﬀect may be exactly canceled out, or internal competition strictly dominates external
competition, or the internal competition eﬀect is consistent with the external competition
eﬀect, therefore without any externality and prior collusion, a competitive group structure
may form endogenously in equilibrium and ﬁrms tend to avoid competition inside each group.
The analyses of an Anderson-Neven-Pal model are instructive in studying the conditions for
a capacity to implement a “Nash combination.”
1 Introduction
Beginning with the original work of Hotelling (1929), spatial competition has been studied for
over seven decades. Compared to other oligopoly models, the analyses of spatial competition not
only present traditional oligopoly characteristics, but also display the equilibrium in a geometric
way; thus, spatial competition models are often instructive so as to study the general rules
about equilibrium competition patterns in a non-cooperative game. Hotelling (1929) analyzes
a location-price non-cooperative game in a linear market with a linear transportation cost and
he claims that both ﬁrms agglomerate at the market center in equilibrium. Hotelling’s claim is
termed as “the principle of minimum diﬀerentiation,” and ever since then the analyses concerning
locational agglomeration and dispersion have opened up.
Although the original intention in Hotelling (1929) is to try to relax Bertrand competition by
a spatial or physical diﬀerentiation in products, d’Aspremont et al. (1979) show that the relaxing
eﬀect in competition is not strong enough when the two ﬁrms are too close. Hence, the second
stage of Hotelling’s location-price game is not well deﬁned and the location equilibrium does
not exist. To avoid the problem in Hotelling’s framework, d’Aspremont et al. (1979) propose
to apply a quadratic form of transportation costs and conclude that the two ﬁrms locate at
the two ends of a linear market in equilibrium, which is termed as “the principle of maximum
diﬀerentiation.”
Instead of a linear market, Salop (1979) considers oligopoly competition in a one-dimensional
bounded market without a boundary, i.e. a circular market. Kats (1995) follows Salop’s settings
and shows that the equal-distance dispersion is a location equilibrium in a location-price game.
Kats attributes non-existence of the equilibrium in pure strategies under a Hotelling model to
the fact that neither ﬁrm competes with rivals on both sides of their locations, and thus the
locations of ﬁrms tend to agglomerate in a linear market, but disperse when a circular market
is considered.
1In contrast to a location-price game, Hamilton et al. (1989) and Anderson and Neven
(1991) consider a location-quantity (Cournot competition) game in a linear market with spatial
discrimination. Both papers state that the two ﬁrms agglomerate at the market center in the
unique equilibrium. Anderson and Neven (1991) not only successfully explain the overlapping of
duopolists’ market shares, but also claim that the equilibrium location pattern is determined by
the instruments in competition: Cournot competition yields a spatial agglomeration. Gupta et
al. (1997) extend Anderson and Neven’s framework to a non-uniform distribution of consumers
and demonstrate that the agglomeration equilibrium is robust under a wide variety of consumer
distributions. Mayer (2000) allows the production cost to vary in diﬀerent market points and
concludes that the agglomeration of ﬁrms is still a common result in a linear market.
In a recent paper, Pal and Sarkar (2002) extend a location-quantity game in a linear market to
cases when multiple plants are owned by each ﬁrm. Pal and Sarkar (2002) provide a fascinating
induction to demonstrate that the complex problem in determining the equilibrium locations
of plants for competitive multi-plant ﬁrms can be approximated by a simple one whereby each
ﬁrm behaves as a multi-plant monopolist in determining the locations of its plants. Pal and
Sarkar (2002) verify that the inter-ﬁrm agglomeration equilibrium claimed in Anderson and
Neven (1991) is robust in the multi-plant cases when both ﬁrms have an equal number of plants.
When the number of plants owned by each ﬁrm is not the same, however, Cournot competition
may give rise to complete spatial dispersion.
To verify the deterministic viewpoint in Anderson and Neven (1991), Pal (1998) proposes a
location-quantity game to a circular market. The oligopoly model with Cournot competition in a
circular market is called an Anderson-Neven-Pal model (or, in short, an A-N-P model) through-
out this paper. Pal (1998) discovers a dispersed location equilibrium and hence he claims that
the market structure (i.e. linear or circular market) is a more crucial factor than the competition
device (i.e. price or quantity). Chamorro-Rivas (2000) further veriﬁes Pal’s dispersed location
equilibrium even when multi-plant cases are considered. Matsushima (2001), however, oﬀers a
counter example to Pal’s dispersed location pattern: When there is an even number of ﬁrms in
a circular market engaging in Cournot competition, half of the ﬁrms agglomerate at one point
and the rest of the ﬁrms agglomerate at the opposite point in equilibrium.
There are several questions which have not yet been answered in the literature. First, does
a deterministic viewpoint exist to exhibit the most signiﬁcant factor in determining whether the
ﬁrms’ locations are agglomerated or dispersed in equilibrium? Second, similar to the question
asked in Pal (1998), does any general conclusion exist regarding the equilibrium location patterns
in a circular Cournot competition? Due to the existence of a counter example in Matsushima
(2001) against the intuition of the dispersed location equilibrium in Pal (1998) that equilibrium
locations tend to minimize the aggregate transportation cost of all ﬁrms, the consistent intuition
behind all equilibria in a circular Cournot competition needs to be re-examined.
The purpose of this paper is to show that there are many more symmetric and asymmetric
2equilibrium location patterns missing in the literature, which can be found by applying the
characteristics of location equilibria. It is implied by the ﬁndings of equilibrium location patterns
that the true intuition in an Anderson-Neven-Pal model is for each ﬁrm to “avoid competition
in groups in equilibrium.” In other words, without any externality and collusion in advance
in a non-cooperative game, various competitive group structures may endogenously form, and
ﬁrms tend to avoid competition with the other ﬁrms inside the same group in equilibrium.1
The new ﬁndings of equilibria not only oﬀer a great diversity of equilibrium location patterns
in spatial competition, but also show that, unfortunately, whether equilibrium locations are
agglomerated or dispersed cannot be systematically categorized by some principal determinants,
such as market structures or competition devices.
Fortunately, this paper further presents a characteristic of an Anderson-Neven-Pal model
whereby, under some conditions, an equilibrium proﬁle with a large number of ﬁrms can be char-
acterized by several sub-proﬁles, each corresponding to a Nash equilibrium with a small number
of ﬁrms. These conditions may be applicable in other oligopoly models or non-cooperative games
with a large number of players. Therefore, as with the varieties of equilibrium location patterns
going beyond what many can imagine about, the value of an Anderson-Neven-Pal model in both
the spatial competition and the group interaction topics exceeds our expectations. This value of
the model can be strikingly highlighted only by examining the true intuitions behind the model
itself.
Intuitively, the existence of a group of outside ﬁrms inevitably intensiﬁes the competition
faced by each ﬁrm inside a group. There are, however, some situations where the ﬁrm’s best
response for competition with the other ﬁrms inside the same group is not inﬂuenced by the
existence of groups of outside ﬁrms. For instance, this occurs when the external competition
eﬀect from one outside ﬁrm is exactly canceled out by that from another outside ﬁrm; or the
internal competition inside the group strictly dominates competition with outside ﬁrms; or
the best response for the other inside ﬁrms’ choices is consistent with that for the outside ﬁrms’
choices. Given that the choices of outside ﬁrms match a speciﬁc pattern, when the best response
of each ﬁrm inside a group for internal competition is not changed by the outside ﬁrms’ choices,
the existence of outside ﬁrms will not alter the Nash equilibrium status quo of competition inside
the group. Suppose that the outside ﬁrms’ best responses for their interior competition are not
altered for the same reasons when the equilibrium locations inside the group is given; then a
1This is in contrast to the analyses of congestion games such as Rosenthal (1973), Milchtaich (1996), Konishi
et al. (1997a), and group formation games in Konishi et al. (1997b) and Hollard (2000), whereby diﬀerent groups
are separated by diﬀerent alternatives (i.e. the players in the same group choose the same alternative) and each
player’s action is equivalent to choosing which group he/she joins. In the present paper, each action has no
apparent relationship with the group chosen by the player, and a group structure (which means a partition of the
set of all players) is generated by the equilibrium competition patterns in locations. In other words, each ﬁrm
forms a group with the most inﬂuential rivals in competition rather than with the other players choosing the same
alternative.
3combination of the equilibrium proﬁle of the inside ﬁrms with that of the outside ﬁrms will of
course corresponds to a Nash equilibrium proﬁle of all ﬁrms of all groups. To the authors’ best
knowledge, this intuitive view is a novel aspect and will be examined henceforth.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the settings of the model.
Section 3 presents the characteristics of a location equilibrium. The analysis of SPNE location
patterns is shown in Section 4. Finally, the conclusions are discussed in Section 5.
2 The Model
Suppose there are N ﬁrms engaging in spatial Cournot competition, N ≥ 2, where consumers
are uniformly distributed on a circular market with a perimeter normalized to 1. Denote qi
and xi as the quantity and the location of ﬁrm i, respectively, i ∈{ 1,...,N}. Hence, the
strategy proﬁles (qi)N
i=1 and (xi)N
i=1 represent the quantity and the location choices of N ﬁrms,
respectively.
Following Anderson and Neven (1991) and Pal (1998), each ﬁrm’s demand function on each
point x in a circular market is set to be




It is assumed that all ﬁrms have the same production technology and zero production cost.
Following the same notations in Kats (1995) and Pal (1998), the transportation cost of goods
from plant xi to one point x is expressed as t ·| x − xi|, i =1 ,...,N, where |x − xi| represents
the shortest distance between xi and x in a circular market. To ensure that each ﬁrm serves
the whole market, α>N t / 2 is assumed, and for simplicity t is assumed to be 1. Given the
locations and quantities of all ﬁrms, the proﬁt function of ﬁrm i in one market point x, where
x ∈ [0,1), is expressed as
πi(x1,x 2,...,xN,x)=( pi(x) −| x − xi|) qi(x),i , =1 ,...,N. (2)
The equilibrium concept adopted in this paper is that of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
(Selten, 1975). The backward induction approach is applied to ﬁnd the subgame perfect Nash
equilibria of a two-stage non-cooperative game, where all ﬁrms choose their locations simulta-
neously in the ﬁrst stage and then they simultaneously decide their quantities in the second
stage. Assume that any arbitrage among the consumers is infeasible and production costs are
irrelevant to quantities and locations. Hence, the ﬁrm’s quantity choices and the competitions
among ﬁrms in quantities are strategically independent across diﬀerent market points. There-
fore, the Cournot equilibrium in the second stage is a composite of the equilibrium quantities
at all market points x ∈ [0,1). It can be checked that the equilibrium quantities and proﬁts in







|x − xj|−(N +1 ) |x − xi|), (3)
πi(x1,x 2,...,xN,x)=qi(x1,x 2,...,xN,x)2,i =1 ,...,N. (4)
In the ﬁrst stage, given the other ﬁrms’ locations, each ﬁrm chooses its plant location to




πi(x1,x 2,...,xN,x) dx, (5)
s.t. xi ∈ [0,1),i =1 ,...,N. (6)
To simplify the induction processes of ﬁnding the subgame perfect Nash equilibria, it is appro-
priate to analyze the properties characterizing the location equilibria, which are presented in
the next section.
3 Characteristics of a Location Equilibrium
Following the symbolic notations in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), for any strategy proﬁle
s ≡ (xi)N
i=1 and any i =1 ,..,N, denote s−i to be the vector of all ﬁrms’ locations except the
location of ﬁrm i, i.e. s−i ≡ (x1,...,xi−1,x i+1,...,xN). One can also denote (s−i,x i) to represent
the proﬁle (xi)N
i=1. Furthermore, the locations of a subset of all ﬁrms with nl ﬁrms, where
1 ≤ nl ≤ N, can be expressed by a list sl =( xl
1,...,x l
nl), whereby every element xl
j ∈ sl
corresponds to a diﬀerent ﬁrm’s location xi ∈ s. Suppose there are L lists sl, l =1 ,...,L,
whereby the location of each ﬁrm i corresponds to one (and only one) element of one and only
one list for all i =1 ,...,N, then one can also denote (sl)L
l=1 to represent the proﬁle (xi)N
i=1. The
deﬁnition of sl helps highlight the formation of competitive groups. It should be emphasized
ﬁrst that, however, the properties of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) locations.
These properties help to determine the SPNE location patterns in the next section.
Proposition 1. Given s∗
−i and xi ∈ [0, 1
2], the necessary condition of an optimal location for

















|x − xj| dx. (7)













5Diﬀerentiating Πi(x1,...,x N) with respect to those xi which appear in the upper and lower







2 =0 . (9)
Since |x−xi| equals (xi−x), (x−xi), and (1−x+xi), for all x belongs to [0,x i), [xi,x i+ 1
2),
and [xi + 1






















N+1, ∀ x ∈ [0,x i) ∪ [xi + 1
2,1),
N
N+1, ∀ x ∈ [xi,x i + 1
2).
(11)





















































Equation (13) shows that the optimal location for ﬁrm i coincides with its quantity-median.
For there is no boundary in a circular market, however, by contrast to the quantity-median




qi(x1,...,x N,x)dx is added to the right-hand side of the quantity-median condition in
a circular market (equation (13)). Furthermore, it is always true for all xi ∈ [0, 1





α − N(|x − xi|)dx =
Z xi
0




α − N(|x − xi|)dx. (14)
2The intuition of equation (9) is explained as follows. Since each ﬁrm serves the whole market for all its
locations, any adjustment of xi aﬀects ﬁrm i’s aggregate proﬁt through only a redrawing of the distribution of
quantities supplied over the whole market rather than changing the market range served by ﬁrm i.


















|x − xj|dx. (15)
Equation (15) is deﬁned as the “transportation-cost-median (of other ﬁrms) condition” through-
out this paper.4 k
Any location xi is said to be at a transportation-cost-median if xi coincides with equation (7).
It should be noted that equation (7) is equivalent to the ﬁrst-order condition of optimization,
and furthermore, this equivalence is not aﬀected by the order of locations xi, i =1 ,...,N.I n
other words, given the locations of the other ﬁrms, the transportation-cost-median condition
checks which candidate point is ﬁrm i’s optimal location in the interval [0, 1
2].5
For ﬁrm i’s arbitrary location, the diameter passing through xi of course divides the whole
market into two half-circles. The transportation-cost-median condition implies that, given the
other ﬁrms’ locations, the aggregate transportation cost to the consumers in one half-circle left
(or right) to ﬁrm i’s optimal location is the same as that in the other half-circle. The intuition
is that, when x∗
i is not at a transportation-cost-median, it is not at a quantity-median either.
In a spatial Cournot competition, the marginal proﬁt from one half-circle (left or right to x∗
i)
due to a tiny change in x∗
i is positively related to the aggregate quantity from that half-circle.
Hence, once the aggregate quantity of one half-circle is not equal to that of the other half-circle,
the aggregate proﬁt for ﬁrm i can be raised by an inﬁnitesimal increase or decrease in x∗
i. Thus,
x∗
i cannot be an optimal location for ﬁrm i. To save words in the following statements, the
right-hand side and the left-hand side of the transportation-cost-median condition should be
denoted by some simple and clear notations.
Deﬁnition 1. Denote LHS and RHS to represent the left-hand side and the right-hand side









3There does not exist an equality similar to equation (14) for all xi in a linear market; thus, the quantity-
median condition in a linear Cournot competition such as Pal and Sarkar (2002) cannot be simpliﬁed to be a
transportation-cost-median condition.
4For all xi ∈ [0,
1
2], it can be checked that
R xi+ 1
2
xi |x − xi|dx =
R xi




|x − xi|dx =
1
8. Hence,
the words in the parentheses “of other ﬁrms” can be replaced by the words “of all ﬁrms” and will be omitted
hereafter.
5For the location problem in another half-circle xi ∈ [1/2, 1), the necessary condition of optimization for ﬁrm i




























There are several implications behind the transportation-cost-median condition which are
useful to simplify subsequent inductions and instructive to explore an A-N-P model.






Proof. Since for each j 6= i,
R 1
0 |x − xj|dx = 1
4,6 and the number of all ﬁrms except ﬁrm i is
N − 1, thus LHS + RHS =( N − 1)
R 1
0 |x − xj|dx =( N − 1)/4. Therefore, the transportation-
cost-median condition LHS = RHS can be rewritten as LHS =( N − 1)/8. k
Remark 1 implies that the information from one side of the transportation-cost-median
condition is suﬃcient to ﬁnd the locations satisfying the necessary condition of optimization,
and thus attention can be focused on only LHS hereafter.7 From the transportation-cost-median
condition, the optimal location for ﬁrm i must balance the aggregate transportation costs of the
two half-circles which are divided by the diameter passing through x∗
i. Hence, the following
remark is consistent with normal intuition.
Remark 2. Given s∗
−i and xi ∈ [0, 1
2], if no ﬁrm is located in the interval (xi + 1
2,1) ∪ [0,x i),
but there exists at least one ﬁrm located in the other interval (xi,x i + 1
2), or vice versa, then xi
does not satisfy the transportation-cost-median condition for ﬁrm i.
Proof. For each xj ∈ [xi,x i+1
2], j 6= i, since xj−xi ≥ 0 and xj−(xi+1




xi |x − xj|dx =
R xj
xi (xj − x)dx +
R xi+ 1
2




8. There exists, however, at least one ﬁrm with a location xj ∈ (xi,x i + 1




xi |x − xj|dx < 1
8. Thus, it is proved that LHS < N−1
8 and from Remark 1, the
transportation-cost-median condition for ﬁrm i is not satisﬁed. k
In an A-N-P model, each ﬁrm oﬀers its most quantities to those consumers living around its
plant. The implication of Remark 2 shows that, if there exists a half-circle without any ﬁrm,
then ﬁrm i can earn more proﬁt by moving its major market to serve those consumers. The
phenomenon shown in Remark 2 is due to the strategic location eﬀect that the more competitor’s




0 |x − xj|dx =
R xj
0 (xj − x) dx +
R xj+ 1
2




(1 − x + xj) dx =
1
4. On the




0 |x − xj|dx =
R xj− 1
2




(xj − x) dx +
R 1
xj(x − xj) dx =
1
4.
7The reason for choosing LHS rather than RHS is based on the convenience in calculations.
8quantity there is, the less one ﬁrm’s demand will be when the products of the ﬁrms are complete
substitutes (refer to equation (1)). Under spatial Cournot competition, the area with the rival’s
highest quantity is the location of the rival’s plant, and thus the best response for each ﬁrm is
to move away from rivals’ locations as far as possible.
Corollary 1. (Transportation-cost-median property) In an A-N-P model with N ﬁrms,
a proﬁle of locations s∗ =( x∗
1,x ∗
2,...,x ∗
N) constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with
N ﬁrms if and only if x∗
i is at a transportation-cost-median, for all i =1 ,...,N.
The intuition of Corollary 1 is that, given the locations of other ﬁrms, the optimal location
for the ﬁrm is at a transportation-cost-median. Hence, if in an SPNE there exists any ﬁrm whose
location is not at a transportation-cost-median, then this ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate from its
equilibrium location to a transportation-cost-median location, a contradiction to the deﬁnition
of SPNE. The transportation-cost-median condition, however, is only a necessary condition of
optimization. The candidate point satisfying the transportation-cost-median condition must be
checked by the second-order condition to ensure that it is a maximizer rather than a minimizer
for ﬁrm i’s proﬁt function.
Proposition 2. In an A-N-P model with N ﬁrms, given s∗
−i and suppose xi ∈ [0, 1
2], the sign
of the second-order derivative of Πi(x1,...,x N) with respect to xi is the same as the sign of the


















|xi − xj| T 0. (17)














































|xi − xj|. (19)




















































j6=i |xi − xj|).
9Since N>0, the proposition can be proved by a comparison of equations (18) and (19). k
Proposition 2 shows that LHS must be negatively sloped at x∗
i to ensure it being the optimal
location for ﬁrm i. Otherwise, if ∂LHS/∂xi = 0, then the third-order derivative of the proﬁt
function must be checked. Instead of the complexity in calculating ∂2Πi/∂x2
i, Proposition 2
and Remark 1 show that the equilibrium locations can be found and veriﬁed by using only the
information of LHS of the transportation-cost-median condition. Furthermore, the second-order
condition of optimization can be simpliﬁed as follows.
Remark 3. In an A-N-P model with N ﬁrms, the second-order condition of optimization for










at the optimal location x∗
i.
Proof. Since for each j 6= i, |xi + 1
2 − xj| = 1
2 −| xj − xi|, thus,
PN
j6=i|xi + 1
2 − xj| = N−1
2 −
PN
j6=i |xi−xj|. Therefore, a suﬃcient condition h<0 can be re-written as
PN
j6=i |xi−xj| > N−1
4 .
k
It is noted that once ˜ h<(N − 1)/4, then the second-order condition of optimization is not
satisﬁed. The simpliﬁed form of the second-order condition of optimization shown in Remark 3
is helpful in proving the following remark.








2 +( N − 2)d) such that d ≥ 0 and |x∗
N − x∗
2| =( N − 2)d<1
2, there then exists a non-




2| where the second-order condition of optimization for ﬁrm
1 is not satisﬁed for all x1 ∈ (x∗
2 − a,x∗
N + a).
Proof. See Appendix 1. k








Thus, Remark 4 shows that, given two competitors’ locations are not at the two ends of the same
diameter, ﬁrm 1’s optimal location is only possible in the half-circle farthest from its competitors
on average. When N>3, it is implied by Remark 4 that, compared to any location in a less
competitive market area, to locate in an area with aggressive competition is not an optimal
choice and further veriﬁes the avoiding-competition gravity in an A-N-P model.
104 Analysis of the SPNE Location Patterns
4.1 Basic equilibrium location patterns
After examining several properties of the equilibrium locations, there are now enough instru-
ments to induct the SPNE location patterns in an A-N-P model. It is appropriate to ﬁrst
investigate the basic equilibrium location patterns in the cases with a small number of ﬁrms.
Some interesting implications can be pointed out by a comparison of these basic location patterns
with those patterns when there is a generalized number of ﬁrms in the market.
Proposition 3 (Pal, 1998). When there are two ﬁrms (N =2 ) , the dispersed location pattern
(x∗
1,x ∗
2) such that |x∗
1 − x∗
2| = 1
2 constitutes the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Without loss of generality, given x∗
2 = 0 and consider x1 ∈ [0, 1
2], then from Remark
2 only two points x1 = 0 and x1 = 1
2 coincide with the transportation-cost-median condition.
Furthermore, when N =2 ,˜ h =0< N−1
4 = 1
4 at x1 = 0 and ˜ h = 1
2 > 1
4 at x1 = 1
2. Thus, from
Remark 3, given x∗
2 = 0, only x∗
1 = 1
2 is the unique optimal location for ﬁrm 1, and vice versa.
Therefore, it is proved that (x∗
1,x ∗
2)=( 0 , 1
2) constitutes the unique SPNE. k
Based on the remarks in the previous section, the proof of the above proposition can be
written in a very concise form. From Proposition 3, the uniqueness of the equilibrium is valid in
an A-N-P model with two ﬁrms. In what follows, however, it will be shown that the variety of
the equilibrium location patterns is not unique when there are more than two ﬁrms competing
in a circular market with quantities and locations.
Lemma 1. Suppose there are three ﬁrms in an A-N-P model (N =3 ) . The proﬁt is the same
for ﬁrm 1 for all its available location choices when a dispersed location pattern of the other
ﬁrms s−1 =( x2,x 3) is given such that |x2 − x3| = 1
2.
Proof. Without loss of generality, given x2 ∈ [0, 1
2] and x3 = x2 + 1





(4α2 − 2α +1 ) , ∀ x1 ∈ [0,1). (21)
It is noted that Π1 is independent of x1, and thus the proﬁt is the same for ﬁrm 1 for all locations.
k
Starting from an arbitrary location in a circular market, given that the other two ﬁrms are
located at two ends of the same diameter, when ﬁrm 1 moves toward one ﬁrm, its location at
the same time moves away from the other ﬁrm in the same distance. Furthermore, when the
ﬁrms engage in spatial Cournot competition, the shorter the distance is between ﬁrm 1 and any
other ﬁrm, the more intensive the competition (and thus the smaller equilibrium quantities) will
be between them (refer to equation (3)). Hence, given the locations of the other two ﬁrms being
11opposite to each other, an increase in the intensity of competition from ﬁrm 1 with one of the
other two ﬁrms will be exactly canceled out by a decrease in that competition with the other
ﬁrm. Therefore, all location choices yield the same intensity in competition and thus the proﬁt
is the same for ﬁrm 1 for all its locations. Lemma 1 highlights a characteristic of an A-N-P
model with three ﬁrms whereby one ﬁrm’s optimal location choice is independent of the choices
of the other ﬁrms, given that the locations of the other ﬁrms match one speciﬁc pattern in that
they are opposite to each other.
The property shown in Lemma 1 will be generalized to an N-ﬁrm version in Lemma 2. This
property can help ﬁnd asymmetric location equilibria in an A-N-P model with three ﬁrms - a
ﬁnding that is missing in the literature.




3)=( 0 , 1
3, 2
3) constitutes a symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; (ii) The
semi-agglomerated-at-two-points location pattern where (x∗
1,x ∗
2,x ∗







2) constitutes an asymmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix 2. k
Besides Matsushima’s (2001) agglomeration-at-two-points location pattern, Proposition 4
oﬀers another counter example to Pal’s (1998) intuition that equilibrium location patterns min-
imize the total transportation cost of serving the entire market. To minimize the total trans-
portation cost, given s∗
−1 =( 0 , 1
2), the location x1 = 1
4 (or x1 = 3
4) should strictly dominate
other location choices for ﬁrm 1. The statement is not true in an A-N-P model, however. From
Lemma 1, when s∗
−1 =( 0 , 1
2) is given, the proﬁt is the same for all ﬁrm 1’s location choices.
Hence, in the case with three ﬁrms, the minimum transportation cost principle is valid only in
the dispersed location pattern. The real intuition behind all location equilibria in an A-N-P
model can be strikingly revealed by examining the generalized N-ﬁrm cases, while the intuition
of the second part of Proposition 4 will be explained after Proposition 6.
4.2 Equilibrium location patterns with N ﬁrms
When there are N ﬁrms engaging in Cournot competition in a circular market, all location equi-
libria can be categorized into ﬁve equilibrium location patterns which are shown subsequently
in what follows.
Proposition 5. (Dispersed-by-pairs location pattern) In an A-N-P model with N ﬁrms
(N is even), suppose there are N
2 lists sl∗ =( xl∗
1 ,x l∗
2 ), l =1 ,...,N
2 , such that |xl∗
1 − xl∗
2 | = 1
2,
then the proﬁle s∗ =( sl∗)
N
2
l=1 constitutes a symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix 3. k
12The dispersed-by-pairs location pattern in Proposition 5 shows that all ﬁrms are located at
two ends of N
2 diameters where each diameter may or may not overlap with another diameter.
In other words, when there is an even number of ﬁrms in an A-N-P model, an equilibrium
location pattern with N ﬁrms is just an arbitrary combination of N
2 lists such that each of
them corresponds to an equilibrium location proﬁle with two ﬁrms. Denote θl ∈ [0,π]t ob e
the degree of angle between the diameter passing through the points in sl∗ and the diameter of
s(l−1)∗, l =2 ,...,N




l=2 such that θl ∈ [0,π], l =2 ,...,N
2 , corresponds to a location equilibrium. Therefore,
Matsushima’s (2001) agglomerated-at-two-points location pattern is a special case with θl =0 ,
∀ l =2 ,...,N
2 , and Pal’s (1998) dispersed location pattern is also a speciﬁc case with θl =2 π/N,
∀ l =2 ,...,N
2 . In fact, in the aspect of (θl)
N
2
l=2, there are inﬁnite equilibrium location patterns.
Proposition 5 implies that, given N −2 ﬁrms’ locations (sl∗)
N
2
l=2 whereby each ﬁrm is opposite
to another on the same diameter, the relative consideration among diﬀerent location choices for
the ﬁrm with location x1





l=2. In other words, the ﬁrm with x1
1 chooses to avoid competition (or say,
to be paired) with the ﬁrm that is not paired with any other ﬁrms, as does the ﬁrm with x1
2.
Therefore, the existence of the other N − 2 ﬁrms that are paired with each other is neutral to
the competition of the ﬁrms with location variables in s1 =( x1
1,x 1
2), and the same property is
presented for all sl. All ﬁrms can thus be viewed as several groups which are divided by the
equilibrium competition patterns.
Proposition 5 is very helpful in revealing the intuition in an A-N-P model. In a circular
Cournot competition, the consideration of each ﬁrm may not be consistent with that to minimize
the transportation cost of all ﬁrms (as claimed in Pal (1998)), nor is it consistent to agglomerate
with some other ﬁrms (as claimed in Matsushima (2001)).9 As highlighted in Proposition 5 and
the following propositions, the real intuition behind the competition in an A-N-P model is to
“avoid competition with the other ﬁrm(s) in the same group (pair).” That is, in equilibrium,
a competitive group structure is naturally formed where each ﬁrm tends to avoid competition
with the other ﬁrms inside the same group. The reason for Proposition 5 being valid is closely
related to several characteristics of an A-N-P model, which will be explained after Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. (Neutral property) In an A-N-P model with N +1ﬁrms (N is even), the proﬁle
of all ﬁrms’ locations can be viewed as s =( x1,(sl)
N
2





2 are given that |xl∗
1 − xl∗
2 | = 1
2, l =1 ,...,N
2 , then when (sl∗)
N
2
l=1 is given, the proﬁt is the




















2) and for arbitrary x
0
3 ∈ [0,1), the optimal location for ﬁrm 1 is always x
∗















2) and arbitrary x
0
2 6= 0, however, x1 = x
0
2 is not an optimal location for ﬁrm 1. Therefore,
when s
∗




2) is given, the consideration of ﬁrm 1 in choosing x
∗
1 = 0 is to avoid competition with ﬁrm 3
(or ﬁrm 4), rather than to agglomerate with ﬁrm 2.
13same for ﬁrm 1 for its all available location choices x1 ∈ [0,1). At this time, (sl∗)
N
2
l=1 is said to
present the neutral property.
Proof. Since all ﬁrms except ﬁrm 1 are located at the two ends of N
2 diameters (one diameter
may or may not coincide with another diameter), then without loss of generality, one can denote
xl∗
1 and xl∗









2 | = 1
2.
As shown in the proof of Proposition 5, for each x ∈ [x1
1,x 1
1 + 1
2), there exists one and
only one point x0 ∈ [x1
1 + 1
2,1) ∪ [0,x 1
1) and |x0 − x| = 1
2 such that |x − x
j∗
1 | = |x0 − x
j∗
2 |
and |x − x
j∗
2 | = |x0 − x
j∗
1 |. Hence, the transportation-cost-median condition is satisﬁed for all
x1 ∈ [0,1), which is equivalent to stating that ∂Π1/∂x1 =0 ,∀ x1 ∈ [0,1). Since Π1 is continuous
in x1 when (sl∗)
N
2
l=1 is given, Π1 is a constant with respect to x1. Thus, it is proved that the
proﬁt is the same for all ﬁrm 1’s available locations. k
Lemma 2 is a generalized version of Lemma 1 with more than three competitive ﬁrms. The
intuition behind Lemma 2 is similar to that of Lemma 1: Given that the locations of the other
ﬁrms match the dispersed-by-pairs location pattern, for any diameter dividing the whole market
into two half-circles, then the location pattern in one half-circle will be the same as that in
the other half-circle after rotating it in a counter-clock direction of 180 degrees, and vice versa.
Therefore, for all diameters, the location pattern in one half-circle is eﬀectively symmetric to
that in the other half-circle. This symmetry of the two half-circles ensures that the intensity of
the competition from ﬁrm 1 with other ﬁrms is the same for all its location choices, and thus
the proﬁt is the same for all x1 ∈ [0,1).
Intuitively, under what situations is the existence of another group of outside ﬁrms neutral
to the competition inside a group of ﬁrms? One trial answer is the situation where there is no
competition between the ﬁrms in diﬀerent groups. The current analysis, however, oﬀers another
potential but interesting explanation for a neutral phenomenon between competitive groups in
an A-N-P model: Given a group of outside ﬁrms achieving an equilibrium, for each inside ﬁrm,
the external competition eﬀects from all outside ﬁrms are exactly canceled out with each other.
Therefore, the comparison among diﬀerent choices only relates to the ﬁrms in the same group,
and the existence of a group of outsiders is neutral to the competition of the ﬁrms inside the
group.
The value of understanding the intuition and the neutral phenomenon in an A-N-P model is
in that, under some circumstances, a Nash equilibrium of a large number of players is composed
of several sub-proﬁles, each corresponding to a Nash equilibrium of a smaller group of players.
From the analysis of Proposition 5, the suﬃcient conditions to construct such a circumstance are
related to two characteristics of an A-N-P model. The ﬁrst characteristic is the neutral property
as shown in Lemma 2 that, given a group of players achieving an equilibrium, the payoﬀ is the
same for any outside player for all its available strategies. When one player makes a comparison
14among diﬀerent strategy alternatives, given an equilibrium proﬁle of outside players presenting
the neutral property, the player is just like facing a market without any outside player, and
thus the competition with outside players is neutral to the internal competition with the other
players inside the same group. The second characteristic is the linearity of each player’s best-
response function in every other player’s alternative (as shown in the transportation-cost-median
condition). This linearity isolates the impact for one player’s best response caused by each other
player and thus the mutual reinforcement of the internal competition eﬀect and the external
competition eﬀect is evaded.
The following proposition veriﬁes whether the intuition of avoiding competition in groups is
valid when there is an odd number of ﬁrms in an A-N-P model.
Proposition 6. (Semi-agglomerated-at-two-points location pattern) For any odd num-
ber N>2, suppose there are N−1
2 lists sl∗, l =1 ,...,N−1





2) or (0, 1
2, 1
2) and sl∗ =( xl∗
1 ,x l∗
2 )=( 0 , 1
2), l =2 ,...,N−1
2 . The semi-agglomerated-at-two-
points location pattern s∗ =( s1∗,s 2∗,...,s
N−1
2 ∗) constitutes an asymmetric subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix 4. k
Proposition 6 oﬀers an equilibrium location pattern, which has not yet been found in the
literature, when there is an odd number of ﬁrms in an A-N-P model.10 Intuitively, for any ﬁrm
with an equilibrium location at 0, since the locations of the other ﬁrms just match the dispersed-
by-pairs location pattern, from the analyses of Lemma 2, the external competition eﬀect from
any ﬁrm is exactly canceled out by another ﬁrm. Therefore, the proﬁt is the same for all its
available locations and the ﬁrm has no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium location 0.
On the other hand, for an arbitrary ﬁrm with an equilibrium location at 1
2, since the locations
of N −3 of the other ﬁrms form a dispersed-by-pairs location pattern, the external competition
eﬀect from these N − 3 ﬁrms is canceled out with each other. Hence, the optimal location is
determined only by the other two remaining ﬁrms whose equilibrium locations are both at 0.
From Proposition 4, the internal competition eﬀect from these two ﬁrms induces the ﬁrm to
have no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium location 1
2.
The semi-agglomerated-at-two-points location pattern shown in Proposition 6 can be viewed
as a composite of N−1
2 location sub-proﬁles such that (N−1
2 −1) of them each ﬁts the equilibrium
location pattern with two ﬁrms (as shown in Proposition 3) and one of them ﬁts the equilibrium
location pattern with three ﬁrms (as shown Proposition 4). Hence, the intuition of avoiding
competition in groups is still valid in the semi-agglomerated-at-two-points location pattern.
Unlike the implications in Proposition 5 whereby any arbitrary combination of the location
equilibria (each with two ﬁrms) corresponds to a location equilibrium with N ﬁrms, Proposition 6
10In fact, the reference point which is the point “0” in Proposition 6 can be generalized to represent any point
in a circular market.
15implies that these N−1
2 location sub-proﬁles can be combined to constitute a location equilibrium
only with some speciﬁc directions. It is noted that the ﬁrms in each location sub-proﬁle, which
matches the equilibrium location pattern with two or three ﬁrms, are on the two ends of the
same diameter. Therefore, the speciﬁc directions require that all these N−1
2 diameters must
overlap with each other.
Even in an A-N-P model, there exist some location equilibria which cannot be decomposed
into several equilibria of diﬀerent and exclusive groups. In these location equilibria, only one
group which contains all ﬁrms in the market is formed, just as shown in Proposition 7 with an
odd number of ﬁrms.
Proposition 7. (Dispersed-completely location pattern) For any odd or even number
N ≥ 2, the dispersed location pattern at an equal distance from the nearest neighboring ﬁrms
such that s∗ =( x∗
1,x ∗
2,...,x ∗
N)=( 0 , 1
N,...,N−1
N ) constitutes a symmetric subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix 5. k
When there is an odd number of ﬁrms, as shown in Proposition 7, no competition eﬀect
from any ﬁrm is canceled out by that from another ﬁrm, and only one group containing all
ﬁrms is formed in equilibrium. The internal competition eﬀect disperses all ﬁrms as evenly as
possible, and as conjured in Pal (1998), the dispersed-completely location pattern minimizes the
total transportation cost of all ﬁrms. The following lemma plays a crucial role in the proof of
Proposition 8 and Proposition 9.
Lemma 3. In an A-N-P model with N +1ﬁrms (N is even), the proﬁle containing all ﬁrms’
locations can be viewed as s =( x1,(xl)N+1
l=2 ). When (x∗
l )N+1
l=2 is given to follow the dispersed-
completely location pattern, then point x∗
1 is ﬁrm 1’s optimal location if and only if there exists
x∗




Proof. Given xl = l−2
N , l =2 ,...,N+1, and without loss of generality, consider x1 ∈ [0, 1
2N]. It
suﬃces to check whether x∗
1 = 1
2N is an optimal location for ﬁrm 1.
From the proof of Proposition 7 (equation (??) in page ??), when only the locations of ﬁrms








|x − xj|dx =
(N − 1)(N − 4x1)
8N
. (22)
From the proof of Proposition 6, equation (??), when x∗





























Since there are N + 1 ﬁrms in the market, from Remark 1, the transportation-cost-median
condition requires that LHS = N
8 , and thus only two points x1 = 0 and x1 = 1
2N are candidates
for optimization.








Therefore, h = 1
2N > 0a tx1 = 0 and h = − 1
2N < 0a tx1 = 1
2N. It is proved that, given
(x∗
l )N+1




2N is an optimal location for ﬁrm 1. k
Lemma 3 shows that every dispersed-completely location pattern with an odd number of
ﬁrms does not present the neutral property deﬁned in Lemma 2. That is, the proﬁt is not the
same for any outside ﬁrm for all its locations when an odd number of the other ﬁrms’ locations are
given to match the dispersed-completely location pattern. The following proposition, however,
shows that a combination of two or more dispersed-completely location proﬁles corresponds to
a location equilibrium with a larger number of players, given that the number of overlapping
stacks is not larger than the number of the elements in each stack.
Proposition 8. (Intergroup-agglomeration-and-intragroup-dispersion location pat-
tern) In an A-N-P model with N ﬁrms, suppose N = nJ, where 2 ≤ J ≤ n. There exists a
location equilibrium s∗ =( s1∗,...,s J∗) where sl∗ =( 0 , 1
n, 2
n,...,n−1
n ), for all l =1 ,...,J.
Proof. See Appendix 6. k
Given the other ﬁrms’ locations, since the location problem is homogeneous for all ﬁrms,
it suﬃces to verify whether any ﬁrm chosen arbitrarily has an incentive to deviate from its
equilibrium location, i.e. the ﬁrm with x1∗
1 = 0. When only the ﬁrms in s1∗
−1 are considered, then
from Proposition 7 the internal competition eﬀect indicates that the optimal location is indeed
at x1
1 = 0. When only the ﬁrms in (sl∗)J
l=2 are considered, then from Lemma 3 the external
competition eﬀect indicates that the optimal location is at x1
1 = 1
2n. When the number of outside
groups is smaller than the number of ﬁrms in each group, however, the competition with other
inside ﬁrms strictly dominates the competition with all outside ﬁrms. Therefore, even when
(s1∗
−1,(sl∗)J
l=2) is given, the optimal location x1∗
1 = 0 is the same as the optimal location when
only s1∗
−1 is given.
Proposition 8 displays an equilibrium location pattern whereby a competitive group structure
with J groups is formed in equilibrium. Here, ﬁrms tend to avoid competition with the other
17ﬁrms inside the same group, and at the same time each of them will agglomerate with one
and only one ﬁrm in each other group. In other words, a combination of J sub-proﬁles each
matching with the dispersed-completely location pattern with n ﬁrms exactly constitutes SPNE
locations with nJ ﬁrms, when the locations of these groups exactly overlap with each other and
the number of outside groups (J − 1) is not larger than the number of the other inside ﬁrms
(n-1). The intergroup-agglomeration-and-intragroup-dispersion location pattern shows that, in
fact, the locational agglomeration or locational dispersion cannot be clearly classiﬁed.
Suppose that each group with n ﬁrms is viewed as a multi-plant ﬁrm with n plants. The
intergroup-agglomeration-and-intragroup-dispersion location pattern is very similar to the equi-
librium location pattern in the multi-plant cases in a linear market as shown in Pal and Sarkar
(2002). In a linear market with multiple plants analyzed in Pal and Sarkar (2002), it is the
intra-brand eﬀect that disperses all of one ﬁrm’s plants and the natural location eﬀect that
dominates the strategic location eﬀect to agglomerate some of the plants of diﬀerent ﬁrms. In
a circular market with a single plant as shown in Proposition 8, however, it is the strategic
location eﬀect (coming from the substitution in demand) that makes all ﬁrms in the same group
avoid competition with each other, while the inter-group agglomeration comes from the internal
competition eﬀect in each group strictly dominating the external competition eﬀect with outside
ﬁrms.
After comparing the dispersed-by-pairs location pattern with the intergroup-agglomeration-
and-intragroup-dispersion location pattern, it is shown that the neutral property is only a suf-
ﬁcient, rather than a necessary, condition for a capacity to implement a “Nash combination”:
A combination of multiple proﬁles, whereby each of them corresponds to a Nash equilibrium
of a smaller group of players, constitutes a proﬁle corresponding to a Nash equilibrium of all
players in all groups. Proposition 9 oﬀers an equilibrium location pattern composed of several
sub-proﬁles whereby some of them present the neutral property, while the others do not.
Proposition 9. (Intergroup-partial-agglomeration-and-intragroup-dispersion location
pattern) In an A-N-P model with N ﬁrms, suppose there are L lists sl∗ =( xl∗
1 ,x l∗
2 ), l =1 ,...,L,






n ), g = L +1 ,...,J, such that
(i) |xl∗
1 − xl∗
2 | = 1
2, l =1 ,...,L, L ≥ 1,
(ii) sg∗ =( 0 , 1
n,...,n−1
n ), g = L +1 ,...,J where 1 ≤ J − L ≤ n, n ≥ 3, and
(iii) ∀ l =1 ,...,L, there exists xl∗
i , x
g∗




then s∗ =( ( sl∗)L
l=1,(sg∗)J
g=L+1) constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with N ﬁrms
whereby N =2 L + n(J − L).
Proof. See Appendix 7. k
Proposition 9 captures the characteristics of a new equilibrium location pattern which has
never been seen in the literature. Suppose there are J lists where (i) L of them follow the
dispersed-by-pairs location pattern; (ii) J − L of them follow the intergroup-agglomeration-
18and-intragroup-dispersion location pattern; and (iii) each paired group has at least one ﬁrm
agglomerating with one (and only one) ﬁrm of every dispersed-completely group; then a com-
bination of all these J lists corresponds to a Nash equilibrium in locations of all ﬁrms in all
groups.
The intuition of Proposition 9 can be discussed in three parts. First, take a look at any
arbitrary ﬁrm in arbitrary group g; for example, ﬁrm 1 in group J (with a location xJ
1). From the
analyses of Lemma 2, the external competition eﬀect from one ﬁrm in each group l, l =1 ,...,L,
is canceled out by the other ﬁrm in that group, and thus the external competition eﬀect coming
from each group l is nil for all l =1 ,...,L. From the analyses of Proposition 9, when the number
of outside groups (J − L − 1) is not larger than the number of the other inside ﬁrms (n − 1),
the internal competition eﬀect from the other ﬁrms in the same group J strictly dominates the
external competition eﬀect from outside ﬁrms in groups g ∈{ L +1 ,...,J − 1}. Thus, the
optimal location xJ∗
1 is eventually determined by the other inside ﬁrms’ locations in the same
group J.
Second, in each group l, l =1 ,...,L, for any ﬁrm whose equilibrium location is agglomerated
with at least one ﬁrm in every dispersed-completely group g, g = L +1 ,...,J. For example,
the ﬁrm with an equilibrium location x1∗
1 agglomerates with another ﬁrm with a location xJ∗
1 .
Since the equilibrium proﬁle of all ﬁrms’ locations except x1∗
1 is exactly the same as that except
xJ∗
1 , then the reasons for xJ∗
1 being an optimal location can also be applied to x1∗
1 .
Finally, in each group l, l =1 ,...,L, for any arbitrary ﬁrm whose equilibrium location does
not agglomerate with any ﬁrm in any dispersed-completely group; for instance, the ﬁrm with
a location variable x1
2. Again, from Lemma 2, the external competition eﬀect from the other
paired groups l ∈{ 2,...,L} is nil. Moreover, from Lemma 3, the best response for internal
competition with the ﬁrm with x1∗
1 is consistent for external competition with the dispersed-
completely groups. Therefore, the optimal location x1∗
2 is the same as the location to avoid
competition with the other ﬁrm inside the same group l =1 .
Proposition 9 shows that, since the external competition eﬀect may be exactly canceled out,
or the external competition eﬀect may be consistent with the internal competition eﬀect, or
the internal competition eﬀect strictly dominates the external competition eﬀect, an optimal
location for local competition may be consistent with that for global competition. Thus, an
equilibrium location pattern under global competition seems the same as a composite of several
location patterns each corresponding to an equilibrium for local competition of a few ﬁrms. It
is now suitable to summarize the equilibrium location patterns in an A-N-P model from the
aspect of an odd or an even number of ﬁrms.
Corollary 2. In an A-N-P model, when the number of ﬁrms N ≥ 2 is even, then the strategy
proﬁle s∗ =( s1∗,s 2∗,...,s J∗) constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, whereby
sl∗ =( xl∗
1 ,x l∗


















N is odd, and J =
N
n
















),g= L +1 ,...,J, n≥
√
N − 2L is odd,1 ≤ J − L ≤ n is even,
and ∀ l =1 ,...,L,there exists xl∗
i ,x
g∗




Proof. The ﬁrst equilibrium location pattern comes from Proposition 5. Since the constraint N
n ≤
n is equivalent to n ≥
√
N, the second equilibrium location pattern is implied by Proposition
8. The third equilibrium location pattern comes from Proposition 9 and a conversion of the
constraint J − L =( N − 2L)/n ≤ n. k
Corollary 3. In an A-N-P model, when the number of ﬁrms N>2 is odd, then the strategy
proﬁle s∗ =( s1∗,s 2∗,...,s J∗) constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, whereby
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),g= L +1 ,...,J, n≥
√
N − 2L is odd,1 ≤ J − L ≤ n is odd,
and ∀ l =1 ,...,L,there exists xl∗
i ,x
g∗




Proof. The ﬁrst equilibrium location pattern comes from Proposition 6, and the second one is
a summary of Proposition 7 and Proposition 8. The third equilibrium location pattern comes
from Proposition 9 where J − L being odd is implied by an odd number N. k
The equilibrium location patterns in an A-N-P model have now been systematically catego-
rized in the above two corollaries. Although the possibility of other equilibrium location patterns
is hard to be ruled out, the results of this paper so far are much more comprehensive than those
in the literatue. The following numerical examples can help to strengthen the conviction of this
paper.
20Table 1. Numerical location equilibria in Anderson-Neven-Pal models.
Number Location equilibria
of ﬁrms
N =2 ( 0 , 1
2)
N =3 ( 0 , 1
3, 2
3), and (0, 1
2,0)





1 ∈ [0, 1
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* For simplicity, given that at least one ﬁrm is located at point 0.
** When N = 3, the proof is shown in Proposition 4. When N =5o rN =7o rN =9 ,
the ﬁrst location equilibrium is proved by Proposition 7 and the second one is implied
by Proposition 6. The details in verifying other location equilibria with an odd number
of ﬁrms are shown in Proposition 9, while the listed equilibria with an even number of
ﬁrms are all covered in Proposition 6 and Proposition 9.
The above numerical results (shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2) can also be checked individually
and the complexity in calculations rapidly rises with the number of ﬁrms increasing in the market.
In other words, the traditional methodology seems diﬃcult to solve the equilibria in an A-N-P
model with an arbitrary number of ﬁrms.11 From these examples, the intuition that ﬁrms tend
to avoid competition in groups in equilibrium in an A-N-P model is always true. For instance,
given s1∗ =( 0 , 1
3, 2
3) and s2∗ =( 0 , 1
2), then the proﬁle s∗ =( s1∗,s 2∗) constitutes an SPNE with
N = 5, where s1∗ and s2∗ are just the location equilibria with two and three ﬁrms, respectively.





















6)), respectively. It is noted that in an A-N-
P model, contrary to the analyses of congestion games such as Rosenthal (1s973), Milchtaich
(1996), and Konishi et al. (1997a), and group formation games in Konishi et al. (1997b) and
Hollard (2000), the group joined by one ﬁrm is not only determined by its own location alterna-
tive, but also by its rivals’ choices. The results of this paper show that although the competitive
group structures and the equilibrium competition patterns are much more varied, however, the
11This is the reason why this paper solves the equilibria by using the characteristics of the equilibria rather
than applying a traditional methodology.
21intuition behind all location equilibria is consistent in that ﬁrms tend to avoid competition with
the other ﬁrms inside the same group which is endogenously formed in equilibrium in a circular
market with Cournot competition.
5 Concluding Remarks
Instead of verifying the equilibrium location patterns in tedious ways, this paper ﬁrst character-
izes the properties of location equilibria in an Anderson-Neven-Pal model, and then uses these
properties to solve the equilibrium location patterns, most of which are not yet found in the litera-
ture. The results show that equilibrium location patterns in a circular market with Cournot com-
petition include the dispersed-by-pairs, semi-agglomerated-at-two-points, dispersed-completely,
intergroup-agglomeration-and-intragroup-dispersion, and intergroup-partial-agglomeration-and-
intragroup-dispersion location patterns. The puzzle about the conﬂict between Pal’s (1998)
dispersed location pattern and Matsushima’s (2001) agglomeration-at-two-points equilibrium is
solved by this paper, showing that both of the equilibria are special cases of the dispersed-
by-pairs location pattern. These new ﬁndings of equilibrium location patterns imply that, like
the shapes of amoebas, the equilibrium competition patterns and the competitive group struc-
tures of an economic society are much more manifold than what one can imagine about spatial
competition.
It is also implied from the diversity of equilibrium location patterns that locational agglom-
eration or dispersion cannot be categorized simply by the market structure (linear or circular
market) or the competition device (Bertrand or Cournot competition). What can be said is, at
most, the intuition behind the location patterns in equilibrium under diﬀerent structures and
competition devices. In a circular market with Cournot competition, the consistent intuition of
all equilibrium location patterns is that ﬁrms tend to avoid competition by groups. When the
external competition eﬀect is exactly canceled out, or the external competition eﬀect is consis-
tent with the internal competition eﬀect, or the internal competition eﬀect strictly dominates
the external competition eﬀect, the existence of a group of outside ﬁrms has no eﬀective impact
on one ﬁrm’s best response for the competition with other inside ﬁrms. In other words, an
optimal location under local competition is consistent with an optimal response for global com-
petition. Therefore, without any externality and prior collusion, a competitive group structure
is endogenously formed by the equilibrium location patterns, and inside each group, ﬁrms tend
to avoid competition with the other insiders. In contrast to the implication of Pal and Sarkar
(2002) where the location choices for one duopolist’s multiple plants can be neutral to that of
the other ﬁrm in equilibrium, this paper shows that, even though competition among all ﬁrms
of all groups does exist in an Anderson-Neven-Pal model, the equilibrium locations of a group
of ﬁrms may be neutral to that of another group of ﬁrms.
Faced with an n-person non-cooperative game problem where the number of players joining
22the game may be a large or an unknown number, an ideal treatment is to ﬁrst divide all
players into several diﬀerent and exclusive groups and solve the equilibrium of each group;
then a combination of all equilibrium proﬁles will correspond to an equilibrium of all players
of all groups. When this ideal treatment is applicable, the model is said to have a capacity to
implement a “Nash combination”. In a model structure with a capacity to implement a Nash
combination, all characteristics of the equilibrium of a 2-person game (or non-cooperative game
with few players) can be maintained with that of an n-person game.
From the analyses of the dispersed-by-pairs location pattern, the suﬃcient conditions include
the neutral property that, given a group of players achieving a Nash equilibrium, the payoﬀ is
the same for any outside player for all available strategies and the linearity of each player’s
reaction function in every other player’s alternative. When one player makes a comparison
among diﬀerent strategy choices, given an equilibrium proﬁle of outside players presenting the
neutral property, the player is just like facing a market without any outsider and thus the
external competition is neutral for the internal competition, while the linearity of the reaction
function isolates the inﬂuence for one player’s best response caused by each of the other players.
It can be inferred that, not only the Anderson-Neven-Pal model, there is a capacity to implement
a Nash combination in all symmetric non-cooperative games satisfying these two conditions. In
these models with a large number of players, a Nash equilibrium under global competition can be
found by ﬁrst looking for Nash equilibria each for a group of few players and then a combination
of these equilibrium proﬁles will yield the exact result. Further serious work, however, is needed
to verify these observations.
The analyses of an Anderson-Neven-Pal model are not only instructive in spatial competi-
tion, but may also have great implications in studies about topics such as anti-trust policy,12
international trade, and the competition between diﬀerent schools,13 organizations, industries,
or networks.
12The suﬃcient conditions to implement a Nash combination can also be viewed as the theoretical conditions
to isolate the competition of a group of ﬁrms from the competition of another group of ﬁrms in equilibrium, which
may be applicable in analyzing industrial policies.
13A professor in one university competes in research not only with colleagues belonging to the same school, but
also with other researchers in other universities, even though they may not be in the same country.
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Figure 2: The equilibrium location patterns with N ﬁrms, N =7 ,8,9, in Anderson-Neven-Pal
models.